



# Integrated telecommunications and electricity assessments for response to natural disasters

Eric Sauvage



# Plan

## Context


- Critical infrastructures, Emergency and Resilience
- The communication lifeline
- Quantification of resilience
- Scope

## Approaches for assessments

- Geospatial and dependency analysis
- Data science approach

# Critical Infrastructures, Emergency and Resilience

**Resilience:** ability of **withstanding** and **recovering** from disruptive events



**4Rs of CI resilience:** **Robustness:** ability to withstand

**Redundancy:** degree to which components and units are interchangeable

**Resourcefulness:** capacity of using and mobilizing resources

**Rapidity:** rate at which the system can recover

# Critical Infrastructures, Emergency and Resilience


**Resilience:** ability of **withstanding** and **recovering** from disruptive events

**4Rs of Civil Defence:** **Reduction:** identification of long-term risks and reduction of their impacts

**Readiness:** development of capabilities and programmes before the emergency

**Response:** actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency


**Recovery:** restoration of services and regeneration of communities after an emergency



# The communication lifeline

## Specificities of the sector


- **Diversity** of technologies
- Mostly **privately-owned**
- Standards:
  - ISO 31000: risk management
  - ISO 22301: business continuity management
  - ISO 27001: information security
- Cybersecurity and resilience



# Quantification of resilience

Metrics for telecommunications networks

- **Topology** Closeness centrality:  $c_c(n) = \frac{N-1}{\sum_u d(u,n)}$ , where  $d(u,n)$  represents the distance between node  $u$  and node  $n$



Node betweenness centrality:  $C_B(n) = \sum_{u \neq v \neq n} \frac{\sigma_{u,v}(n)}{\sigma_{u,v}}$ ,

Edge-betweenness centrality:  $C_B(e) = \sum_{u \neq v} \frac{\sigma_{u,v}(e)}{\sigma_{u,v}}$ ,

where  $\sigma_{u,v}(n)$  and  $\sigma_{u,v}(e)$  are the number of shorter paths from node  $u$  to node  $v$  that passes through the node  $n$  (different from  $u$  and  $v$ ) and the edge  $e$ , and  $\sigma_{u,v}$  the total number of possible paths between two nodes, without including the node  $n$

Algebraic connectivity: determined via analysis of eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of the graph

$$L = \begin{cases} \deg(u) & \text{if } u = v \\ -1 & \text{if } u \text{ and } v \text{ are connected} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

# Quantification of resilience

Metrics for telecommunications networks

- **Dependability** Mean time between failure:  $MTBF = \frac{\sum \text{Operational Times}}{\text{Number of failures}}$   
  
Mean time to repair:  $MTTR = \frac{\sum \text{Maintenance Times}}{\text{Number of maintenance operations}}$
- **Service delivery** Quality of Service (QoS): delay  
packet loss  
throughput

Quality of Experience (QoE), which can be related do situational awareness

# Failure modes in the face of natural disasters

Three main failure modes experienced by telecommunications networks

- **Traffic congestion:** usually observed after earthquakes that have been felt in a large area
- **Physical damage** on the infrastructure elements

Event Infrastructure	Inland /coastal floods	Earthquake	Tsunami	Sea Level Rise	High Temperature	Water Scarcity	High Wind / Storm
Submarine cable (deep sea)	Low	High	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
Submarine cable (near shore)	Low	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
Landing Station	High	High	High	High	Low	Low	Low
Terrestrial Cables (underground)	Medium	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Terrestrial cables (overland)	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium
Datacenters	High	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Low
Antennas	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	High

- **Interruption of power supply:** dependency to the electricity lifeline



# Scope



## Fragments of the network

### Core/transport networks

- meshed topology
- redundancy at site equipment
- back-up power

### Access networks


- low path diversity
- low redundancy of equipment
- limited back-up power



# Assessment for response (1) - Systemic Approach

## Geospatial analysis for the Community Emergency Hubs (CEHs) in the Wellington region (WREMO)

- **Multi-hazard** approach
- Study of **dependencies**
- Focus on the telecom **fixed-line network** and **Wi-Fi access**
- Interconnection between **risk reduction** and **sustainability**, with the use of **decentralized power generation** and back-up




### Community Emergency hubs

- 127 sites in the Wellington region
- Pre-identified places that activated in case of emergency to support communities
- Centralization and sharing of information and resources
- Presence of emergency kits which include a VHF radio
- Presence of a Wi-Fi router

# Assessment for response (1) - Systemic Approach

## Geospatial analysis for the Community Emergency Hubs in the Wellington region (WREMO)

- Hazards and susceptibilities




- Exposure analysis of the optical fiber that connects the CEH to the first telephone exchange

# Assessment for response (1) - Systemic Approach

## Geospatial analysis for the Community Emergency Hubs in the Wellington region (WREMO)

- **Dependencies:** assessment of power backup (for the hub and the telephone exchange)



### Step 1

Does the community emergency hub have a resilient telecom/electricity system?

Selection of the CEHs based on the following criteria:

- Optical fiber connexion
- Wi-Fi router
- Solar panels + inverter
- Batteries



### Step 2

Does the telephone exchange the emergency hub is connected to have an energy back-up system?

Consideration of the following criteria for the exchanges:

- Generator
- Fuel storage capacity



# Assessment for response (1) - Systemic Approach

## Geospatial analysis for the Community Emergency Hubs in the Wellington region (WREMO)

- Scenario of a M7.5 Wellington Earthquake




### Step 3

How does the telecom infrastructure perform during a scenario and what is the consequence of other infrastructure services' outages?

Consideration of the following aspects:

- Damage level on the telecom infrastructure
- Electricity and road outage duration




- Ranking of CEHs and **identification** of sites appropriate for installation of back-up power

Community Emergency Hub ID	CEH - Hazard Exposure			CEH - Telecom		CEH - Electricity		Telephone exchange		Scenario	
	Tsunami Evacuation zone (Yes/No)	Flood zone (Yes/No)	Combined Earthquake Hazard	WiFi router (Yes/No)	Risk for the fiber	Solar panels (Yes/No)	Batteries (Yes/No)	Generator on site (Yes/No)	Autonomy (Days)	Level of damage for the exchange	Road outage (Days)
1	No	No	3/5	Yes	Low	No	No	Yes	15 days	Low	10 days
2	No	No	1/5	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	No	-	Low	7 days
3	Yes	No	1/5	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	Yes	2 days	Low	14 days
4	Yes	Yes	4/5	Yes	High	No	No	Yes	15 days	High	14 days

# Electric Vehicles and Emergency

*Bing Yan, Zhenyang Wang*



Electric substations, in a context of Peer-to-peer energy sharing

- Power quality and disruption mitigation
- Emergency situations: back-up power to critical facilities

Factors for the choice of location of stations

- Local distribution network
- Zone substations
- Busy roads and motorways.
- Traditional main gas stations

# Assessment for response (2) - Data science approach

## **Modelling and Monitoring** electricity outages during natural disasters

### Context and Statement of the problem

#### **Hazard**

- Development of sensing technologies
- Availability of real-time monitoring data, with improvements of resolution (temporal and spatial)

#### **Electricity**


- Association of resilience to high-impact and low-probability (HILP) events
- Contribution of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) to resilience, and to situational awareness

#### **Machine-learning techniques**

- Applications to response to natural disasters, mostly with satellite and social networks data
- Limited work with outage data

# Power systems resilience to high hazard weather events

Sam Robinson, Hemanth Sonthi





Machine learning outage prediction model, for wind-related events

- NIWA wind data
- PowerCo outage data

Directions for improvement of the model

- Higher spatial and temporal resolution for the wind data
- Architecture of PowerCo network
- More diverse range of resilience events and scenarios






# Assessment for response (2) - Data science approach

**Modelling and Monitoring** electricity outages during natural disasters

**Objective:** Rapid impact assessment of the distribution lines



**Approach:** Architecture that also considers the data from distributed resources  
Transfer to other distribution networks

**Expected outcomes:** identification of

- the areas with power interruption after the event
- the cellular stations which are likely to experience power outages

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Thank you!