

Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group


Infrastructure Research Day – Canterbury Update

30 June 2021


Mark Gordon Canterbury Lifelines Group Project Manager


LUC team in the EOC





Risks and Resilience





Outline Contents List

- 1. Summary
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Lifelines Sectors national/regional/local
- 4. Lifelines Interdependencies
- 5. "Hotspots" and "Pinchpoints"
- 6. Important Community Sites
- 7. Description of the Hazards
- 8. Infrastructure Vulnerability to Hazards
- 9. Resilience Gap Analysis
- 10. Building Resilience
- 11. Next Steps

Vulnerabilities of Electricity Generation Assets –

Example

Asset-/-Site#	Gen· MW¤	Criticality	Summary#	Key-Vulnerability-Issues¤
GENESIS⋅¤		n	n	Ω
Lake-Tekapo Outlet-Control- Structure¤	NA¤	National¤	Built-in-the-1950s-this- concrete-dam-and-gate- structure-controls-water- levels-in-Lake-Tekapo.¤	Potential seismic (e.g. Irishman Creek fault) and lake seiche vulnerability. Has 3-4m overflow protection above highest lake level. Currently in early stages of investment in protection measures, including rip rap for high flow rates into canal.
Tekapo·A·Power- station-intake¤	NA¤	National¤	Intake-comprises- structure, tunnel, surge- chamber-and-head- gate Complex- interaction-between- lake-outlet-and-this- structure =	Seismic-vulnerability — 2019- completing-new-gate- structure-at-the-lake-intake- to-mitigate¤
Tekapo·A·Power- Station¤	27-MW¤	National¤	Power-station-comprises building, turbines, separate spill-structure-to-Tekapo-River, and-connection-to-Transpower-grid.¶ Note-that-Tekapo-A-canonly-operate-if-Tekapo-B-is-also-operational. Power-station River-station Note-that-Tekapo-A-canonly-operate-if-Tekapo-B-is-also-operational. Power-station River-station R	Good-seismic-resilience.¶ Heavy-snow-can-be-an- issue-for-access—2012- event-1.5m-snow-depth- compromised-access-for-5- days, similar-in-2006. Station-continues-to- generate-however.¤
Canal — Lake Tekapo·to·Tekapo· B·(at·Lake· <u>Pukaki</u>)∞	NA¤	National¤	Open-canal, partly-in- cut-and-partly-elevated- above-natural-ground¶ Note-presence-of- several-bridges- (including-SH-8)-and- salmon-farm.¤	Bridges (ingl-on-SH-8) have been strengthened for AF8-EQ-event.¶ Managed under dam-safety requirements—Potential impact-Categories (PIC) have been mapped based on canal-breakout-scenarios and impacts on people and other assets.¶ Vulnerable reaches have been lined with PVC-overlay to mitigate cracking / rupturing effects.¶ Worst-case scenarios are mapped in Council documents as potential inundation zones. **Total Council C


Asset·/·Site¤	Gen· MW¤	Criticality	Summary¤	Key-Vulnerability-Issues¤
Tekapo·B·Power· Station¶ (adjacent·to·Lake· Łukaki·into·which- it·spills)¤	160·MW∞	National∞	Power-station-comprises intake, steel-penstocks, powerhouse-structure-built-on-the-lake-floor, turbines, and-overhead-cables-connecting-to-Transpower-grid.	Seiche-not-considered a- threat.¶ Potential-lake-flooding-into- power-house-through- ventilation/-ducts-/- windows.¶ Wind-not-considered an- issue-for-overhead-cables.¶ Penstocks-have-not-yet- been-evaluated(ACTION?)¤
MERIDIAN¤		n	D	D D
Twizel·Control· Centre¤	NA¤	National¤	Located beside SH-8- near-Twizel1980s- building previously- used as Meridian- offices.¤	Access-due-to-heavy-snow.¤
Lake <u>Pukaki;</u> Outlet-Control- Structure (Gates- 18,19)¤	NA¤	National¤	Gate 18 is the only outlet from Lake Pukaki to the canal, and is essential to Ohau system generation.¶ Gate 18 has three independent gates.¶ Gate 19 is a separate spill gate.¤	Gate-18-has-high-PIC- rating_it-has-been-evaluated- and-considered-satisfactory.¤
Lake- <u>Pukaki</u> Outlet-(Dam)¤	NA¤	National¤	Earth-dam. Various- technical reports, confirm-constructed as- per-drawings.¤	Considered-robust∞
Pukaki∙DSF????¤	n	12	α	n
Canal – Lake Pukaki to Ohau <u>A</u> Power Station ∞	NA¤	National¤	Open-canal, partly-in- cut-and-partly-elevated- above-natural-ground¶ Note-presence-of-two- bridges-including-SH-8¤	As for Tekapo Canal above.¶ Potential vulnerability to Ostler EQ fault — elevated canal rupture and loss of Qhau system generation (approx.690MW) — high- PIC rating. • ¤
Lake- <mark>Qhau</mark> -Outlet- Control-Structure¶ (Gate-20??)¤	NA¤	National¤	Concrete-structure-to- control-lake-level-and- amount-of-water- entering-canal-system¤	Considered·robust¤
Canal — Lake Ohau to confluence with Pukaki/Benmore Canal¤	NA¤	National¤	Open-canal, partly-in- cut-and-partly-elevated- above-natural-ground¶ Note-Salmon-farm-at- confluence-point.¤	As for Tekapo Canal above.¶ Potential vulnerability to Ostler EQ fault — elevated canal rupture and loss of Qhau system generation (approx. 690MW) — high- PIC rating¤


Prime Port Timaru - Example



	1		
Facility. ¤	Length¶ Depth·at· CD¶ Max·Vessel· LOA¤	Description#	Key-Vulnerability- Issues¤
No.·1· Extension· Wharf¤	215m¶ 10m¶ 200m¤	Timber-built-wharf-with-a-reinforced-concrete-deck-on-timber-piles, constructed-on-the-inside-of-a-concrete-block-breakwater. "The-wharf-is-equipped-for-handling-oil, tallow, acids, palm-oil, molasses-and-logs." The-wharf-is-also-used-for-discharging-bulk-dry-products. ¶ Includes-major-fuel-lines-along-the-back-of-the-wharf, bunker-point-for-incoming-ships, and-it-is-used-by-trucks.¤	Concrete deck of marginal thickness — potential seismic or tsunami risk. • Vulnerable to "punching" failure. ¶ Petroleum pipework vulnerable.¤
No. 1· Wharf¶ East¶ ¶ ¶	270m¶ 9.9m¶ 100m¤	Timber-built-wharf-with-a-reinforced-concrete- deckBlock-retaining-wall-under-deck,- considered-stableFill-materials-used-littoral- drift-gravels.¶ This-is-a-general-purpose-wharf-and-is-used-by- the-fishing-industry,-general-cargo, vessel-	Wharf-could "pull- away" from the hardstand area- under-seismic-or- tsunami type-load —- inspections and
No. 1 Wharf¶ West¤	270m¶ 9.9m¶ 200m¤	layup and cruise ships. ¶ Adjacent to No. 1 East is a fishing industry owned and operated cool store. ¶ Wharf has had recent (2019) extensive rebeaming works to improve structural capacity. ¶ Includes 2 bunker points for fuel. ¶ Fuel lines for smaller vessels run along the wharf — approx. 40-50m of 150mm dia. □	repair regime in place.¶ Fuel lines vulnerable to breakage — stop valve exists.¤
No. 2· Wharf¶ North¶ ¶ ¤	200m¶ 10.3m¶ 180m¤	A heavy-duty-concrete and steel finger wharf- constructed in 2015 for priority-discharge of- international-cement-bulk-carriers and loading- of-coastal-cement-vessels-(currently-operated- by-Holcim-New-Zealand-Limited).	Considered-robust- but-expect-possible- concrete-spalling-in- major-earthquake.¤
No.·2· Wharf¶ South¤	200m¶ 8.3m¶ 180m¤	seismic-design.¶ The North-Berth-is-used-for-unloading-bulk- carriers-and-the-South-Berth-is-used-for- loading-coastal-cement-vessels·The-South- Berth-is-home-to-the-Milburn-carrier·The- North-Berth-doubles-as-a-berth-for-unloading- bulk-dry-product,-including-fertiliser-and-stock- feeds.¤	
No.·3· Wharf¶ North¤	190m¶ ??¶ 180m∞	Older-timber-built-finger-wharf-with-a-reinforced- concrete-deck-in-reasonable-condition This- wharf-is-used-extensively-by-the-in-shore-	Expect·significant· damage·in· earthquake·or·
No.·3· Wharf¶ South·¤	190m¶ 9.5m¶ 180m¤	fishing fleet and as a layup and maintenance berth for corporate fishing vessels. This is also the berth for PrimePort's two tugs.	tsunami-eventbut- lower-priority- structure.¤
North·Mole∙ Wharf·-·¶ Inner¶ ¤	460m¶ 10.5m¶ 260m∞	The North-Mole is a continuous 460m berth, with 385m being timber construction and the remaining 75m heavy duty precast concrete. ¶ Made up of 6 compartments which are filled	This is the Port's most vulnerable wharf and expected to be compromised
North-Mole· Wharf·-·¶ Outer¤	460m¶ 11.8m¶ 260m¤	with "puggy" dredgings and an AP65 gravel- crust overlaid with 100mm AC surface.¶ Investigating strengthening options – replacing- upper timber deck with reinforced concrete,	especially by major earthquake.¶ Deformation of timber structures —

Timaru District – Water example






Timaru District – Water example


Table 4-61 Timaru District Water Supply Schemes


Scheme	Summary	Key Vulnerability Issues
URBAN ON-DEMA	AND SCHEMES	
Timaru City	Sources – Pareora River and Opihi River (2 locations). Treatment Plant at Claremont. Reservoirs – 113,000 m3 raw (Claremont), 120,000 m3 treated (Gleniti). 4-6 days storage capacity. Pump stations at Rosewill and Gleniti. Generators connected. Single supply lines – Gleniti PS, Washdyke pair which cross Washdyke Creek on SH1 bridge. 100 year old Cl pipe under Saltwater Creek near North St. Reticulation 330km, AC 138km, Cl 84km, PVC 57km, with some PE and ST. Various improvements and renewals planned, including new sources and duplicate mains and strengthening of two connections to the Port. Supply line (steel 450dia) from Pareora source largely being replaced with 500 dia PE or GRP. Involves drillling through gorge and various landslide areas to traverse including stream crossings. Also supplies to Downland-Hadlow and Seadown networks. Population – 26,830	Security of supply. Ageing reticulation. Single main into and out of (150dia AC) Gleniti PS. Buildings vulnerable to EQ
Lemuka	Supplies three distinct areas – Temuka (urban), Orari (restricted supply), Winchester (small, on-demand). Various bore sources Orari River. New sources being considered. Treatment plant and pumping station. Generator fitted. Small PS feeds Orari. Storage 1650m3, old concrete, half day supply. New reservoir and pumping station being built (north of Temuka). Supply main 300dia PVC to Baby Rd. Supply main 450dia PE to Temuka (AC replaced). Reticulation mostly AC and PVC, some PE and ST, gravity from reservoir. Population - 4,620	Security of supply Low storage capacity EQ damage to brittle pipes Reservoir EQ vulnerable
Geraldine	Source – 4 shallow bores near Orari River, with treatment plant and pumping station. Single AC 200 dia supply main to township	EQ damage to brittle pipes. SH bridge crossing.

Scheme	Summary	Key Vulnerability Issues
Geraldine	Source – 4 shallow bores near Qrari River, with treatment plant and pumping station.	EQ damage to brittle pipes.
	Single AC 200 dia supply main to township reservoir along SH79 and across SH bridge in	SH bridge crossing. Reservoir vulnerable to
	Geraldine (thought to be steel pipeline).	EQ damage.
	Reservoir – 2275 m3, equivalent to 12 hours storage.	_
	Reticulation 26km mostly AC and PVC, some PE.	
	Various improvements / renewals planned.	
	Also supplies part of the Te Moana area - Geraldine Flat (restricted) and Geraldine Downs (restricted).	
	Generators fitted where required.	
	Population - 2,400	
Pleasant Point	Shallow wells, treatment plant, new second reservoir (total 2400m3) and 2 pumping stations. Located on north bank of Opihi River.	Reservoir (old) vulnerable to EQ Treatment plant EQ risk
	Generators fitted??	Supply main under river –
	Single supply main to township – crossing under the river.	scour / erosion AC pipes to EQ shaking
	Separate connection 300dia AC to Timaru Scheme via Claremont covered reservoirs	No pipes to Ear straking
	(Otioua Creek) – these have 10 days normal storage	
	Reticulation 16km mostly PVC, some AC, PE and CI.	
	Population – 1,200	
Winchester	Supply ex Jeguka. 8 storage tanks 240m3, pumping station.	Supply pipe under SH1 (north end of town) and
	Single supply main.	south to Temuka
	4.4km reticulation, mix of AC, PVC, PE	
	Population - 264	
Peel Forest	Small township on-site storage scheme.	
r cer r orest	Source spring-fed. Treatment plant, pumps, 3 storage tanks, PE-HD pipes.	
	4 days storage plus customer storage.	
	Has generator plug.	
	Population - 130	
RURAL / RESTRICT	TED SCHEMES	
Downlands.	Jointly owned by Timaru (82%), Waimate, (14%) and MacKenzie (4%) District Councils.	Ageing trunk main Ageing reservoirs
	Primarily stockwater with restricted domestic supply.	River crossings (e.g. Qpih
	Approx 1000km reticulation. Mostly PVC, with ST. PE. AC. CC	River)



Waimakariri District Roads - Example





Cadastrol Data from LINZ's DCDB. Crown Copyright Reserved

Waimakariri District Roads - Example



Route	Summary	Vulnerability
SH 71 – Lineside Road – Kaiapoi to Rangiora	NZTA highway. 2 lane road, elevated carriageway parallel to railway line.	Extensive flooding effects from Kaiapoi to Southbrook and Flaxton. Also affects the Motorway and SH1 to the north of the Ashley River. Detours are a poor alternative. Approx 1-2 days duration but effects of high groundwater can linger for many weeks/months.
Williams Rd and Main North Road - Kaiapoi to Belfast	Sealed road, alternative route via Kaiapoi to SH1 across the Waimakariri River	Flooding, tsunami, sea level rise
Route 72 Waimakariri Gorge to Rangiora	Sealed road, provides alternative intra-regional route to SH 73, West Coast and Mid Canterbury	Snow, flooding, wind. Ashley River breakout – south bank to west of Rangiora (less likely than north bank breakout).
Route 72 Rangiora to HDC boundary	Sealed road – part of intra- regional route linking to SH1 at Amberley	Flooding Ashley River breakout – north bank
Arterial and Collector routes – north of Route 72	Sealed roads	Flooding Loburn and west – rolling country, various rivers and bridges whose abutments could be undermined disrupting access – days-weeks? Confluence of Okuku and Ashley Rivers a potential breakout point – affecting Southbrook to Kaiapoi. Eastern low-lying areas - Ashley River breakout – north bank.
Arterial and Collector routes – south of Route 72	Sealed roads. Some low lying.	Flooding. Waimakariri or Ashley River breakout. High groundwater levels.






Table 4-39 Key Waimakariri District Major Bridges / River Crossings

Table 4-35 Ney Walillakarin District major Dridges / Niver Crossings			
Bridge Location	Summary	Vulnerability	
Old Waimakariri River Bridge	Two lane concrete structure, multi- span. Jointly owned with CCC.	Shallow piles used to present a potential scour risk during high river floods, earthquake shaking	
Kaiapoi River Bridge (Williams St)	Older concrete structure, ex SH1	Flooding – Waimakariri back-up. Utility services failure.	
Route 72 Waimakariri Gorge Bridge	Cast iron structure (old) with multiple spans and high piers. Single lane. Jointly owned with Selwyn DC.	Earthquake shaking, landslide movements	
Route 72 Eyre River Bridge (Depot Rd)	Concrete structure, single lane.	Potential scour risk	
Route 72 Ashley River Bridge	Very recent, modern concrete structure.	Note that secondary banks will isolate the bridge in event of major Ashley River flood. Note scour risk to adjoining railway bridge.	
Ashley Gorge	Multi-span 1990s bridge	Potential for slips	
Makerikari River Bridge (North Loburn)		Scour risk – has HDC water main to Loburn on the bridge	
Garry River Bridge		Potential scour risk	
Okuku River Bridge		Potential scour risk	
Eyre River ford (West Eyreton)		Potential scour risk	
Urban bridges	While generally minor / modest in scale they typically carry utility services. Example – Williams St Kaiapoi		

Rangitata
River/
Orari River
breakout
modelling
near
Temuka





Geospatial Common Operating Picture for Civil Defence in Canterbury





Five Priorities:


- 1. Lifelines Data Hosting
- 2. Situational Awareness
- 3. Cordon Management
- 4. Public Information
- 5. Welfare assessment (Āwhina)



Digital First Sharing




- Single source of truth
- Timely and Authoritative
- Security by design
- Utility defined by the user



ArcGIS Online Collaborations



Online Platform



Central

Government








WaterNZ




Geospatial Roadmap





- Efficient data gathering processes
- Live asset condition data where available
- Trusted relationships between partner agencies
- Data gathered for reduction, readiness, response and recovery processes
- Hazards analysis coordinated with lifelines partners





Geospatial Applications for Emergency Managers


Find and use maps and dashboards for specialist topics in this area



Canterbury Severe Weather Ev...



GCOP App gallery
Geospatial intelligence for
Emergency Managers. Come to this
gallery to access apps built as pa



GCOP Datasets Gallery Use this gallery to locate feature datasets used in the Geospatial Common Operating Picture for



Incident Briefing Dashboard
Map series for EOC application in
collating various sources of
intelligence into a tabbed series






Incident Data editing series
Apps and maps for editing incident
management spatial data
Admins come here to find source



Lifelines Data Dashboard
A tabbed series of lifelines data
themes designed for a discussion
piece around lifelines deliverable



Lifelines Impact Assessment
Proof of concept app providing a
rapid desktop first look at key
considerations for immediate act



Lifelines Risk & Resilience
App providing a risk and resilience
view of Lifelines. This app is live and
uses real data, therefore it is a

Geospatial Data Resources for GIS specialists

A curated collection of reliable GIS data sources, suitable for your own use. Be sure to check the metadata for any limitations that may apply!



Feature Layer

Above Ground Hazardous Stora...

Records showing a summary of a consented activity related to the storage of hazardous materials in



Feature Layer

Active Hurricanes, Cyclones an...

This layer describes the observed path, forecast track, and intensity of tropical cyclone activity (hurrican

Feature Layer
ADC Road Closure Points

Feature Layer
ADC Road Closures















Feature Layer Ashburton_03062021_Evacuati... Sent from Shaun McCracken 3:30pm 03062021.



Feature Layer Bridges (LINZ 50k) Bridge Centrelines from the LINZ Data Service Topo 1:50,000 data



Feature Layer BuildingAssessments_gdb Building assessments related to May 2021 flooding in Canterbury, Data provided by Territorial Authorities



Feature Layer Canterbury CDEM Movement C... Cordons, Evacuation Areas and Road closure feature class for collection of spatial locations for



Ashley Area of concern received 30-

Feature Layer

5-2021

Ashley area of concern

Feature Layer Canterbury Emergency Status This feature class represents a live summary of emergency declarations within the Canterbury Civil Defe



Map Image Layer Canterbury Liquefaction Susce... Canterbury Liquefaction Susceptibility



Feature Layer Canterbury Significant Industry Significant industry and employers in the Canterbury Region




Feature Layer CDEM Group boundaries CDEM Group boundaries





Feature Layer CDEM Public Information CDEM Public Information





Feature Layer Census 2018 - usually resident ... Census 2018 population data at the Statistical Area 2 (SA2) level












Next Stage



- Publication of the Vulnerability Assessment "stocktake"
- Application to NEMA for Resilience Fund support:
 - Further develop the GIS lifelines portal and populate qualitative data from above
 - Data schema / standardisation
 - Describe "maturity-based" pathway to move from traditional vulnerability assessment towards Wellington business case approach
 - Collaborate with science community to develop an "intermediate" level methodology and apply research knowledge
 - Use MERIT to explore economic and social impacts